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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYtlN A. JENKINS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v- ) 
MORONI L. JENSEN, STATE OF ) 
UTAH, ROBERT B. HANSEN, 
Attorney General of the State 
of Utah, DAVID S. MONSON, 
Secretary of State/Lt. 
Governor of Utah, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
CASE NO. 17240 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MORONI L. JENSEN 
NATURE OF CASE 
The plaintiff, Lynn A. Jenkins, brought this 
declaratory judgment action seeking to remove the name of 
defendant Moroni L. Jensen from the 1980 primary election 
ballot. In this election, Mr. Jensen seeks the Democratic 
nomination for the office of Lieutenant Governor/Secretary 
of State. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court for Salt Lake County in an 
order dated July 30, 1980, dismissed the plaintiff's complaint 
with prejudice. Plaintiff's subsequent motion to reconsider 
was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent Moroni L. Jensen seeks an affirrn-
ance of the district court's order which dismissed plaintiff's 
complaint with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although the Statement of Facts in Appellant's Brief 
is generally accurate, it gives an incomplete picture of the 
facts upon which the district court's decision was based. 
Accordingly, defendant Jensen will restate the facts in their 
entirety. 
Plaintiff, Lynn A. Jenkins, is a Republican Candidate 
for the Utah State Senate from Senate District Eight (R. ). 
Like many other candidates for public office in Utah this 
election year, Mr. Jenkins faces a primary run-off on 
September 9, 1980. 
-2-
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Defendant Moroni L. Jensen, a Democrat, has been a 
member of the Utah State Senate. His term of office commenced 
January 1, 1977 and ends December 31, 1980 (R. ). In April 
1980, Mr. Jensen annotmced his intention to run for the position 
of Secretary of State (R. ). He duly filed for the position, 
and ca8e out of the Democratic Party Convention facing a primary 
election in September (R. ). 
On February 2, 1980, the 43rd Legislature enacted House 
Bill 60 which raised the salaries of State officers effective 
January 1, 1981, as follows: 
From To 
Governor $40,000 $48,000 
Attorney General 30,000 36,500 
Secretary of State 26,500 33,500 
State Auditor 26,500 33,500 
State Treasurer 26,500 33,500 
The increase for the Secretary of State, the State Auditor, 
~nd the State Treasurer of $7,000 per year is equivalent to 
26.4 percent. The Attorney General and the Governor received 
a slightly smaller percentage increase amounting to more than 
20 percent. Each of these offices had also received a salary 
increase effective in 1978. With respect to the Secretary of 
State this prior salary increase amounted to $4,500, from 
$22,000 to $26,500. 
-3-
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The 1979 Utah Legislature also passed a joint resolution 
(Senate Joint Resolution No. 7) which places before Utah 
voters in November 1980 several revisions of the Executive 
Article of the Utah Constitution. Among these revisions, 
the Resolution proposes that the name of the office of 
Secretary of State be changed to Lieutenant Governor and 
that the method of election to this position be changed so 
that the candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of 
each party shall appear together on the ballot and a vote 
for the Governor of one party shall be deemed a vote for 
that party's Lieutenant Governor. The Resolution, of course, 
provides that this method of voting for Governor and Lieuten-
ant Governor shall not take effect until the election in 
1984, since there can be no election under the new constitutiona; 
provision for either office until then. Should the constitutiona: · 
revisions be approved by the voters this coming November, the 
name of the office shall be changed to Lieutenant Governor 
effective January 1, 1981. Other than this change of name, 
the proposed constitutional revisions placed before the 
electorate by S.J.R. No. 7 will have no significant effect 
on the office of Secretary of State until the election of 
-4-
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1984. As of now, the changes in the Executive Article are 
a mere proposal, subject to the voter's approval in November. 
Plaintiff Jenkins contends that both the salary 
increase and the modifications in the office of the 
Secretary of State proposed in S. J. R. No. 7 are prohibited 
by Article VI Section 7 of the Utah Constitution: 
No member of the Legistlature, during the 
term for which he was elected, shall be appointed 
or elected to any civil office or profit under 
this State, which shall have been created, or 
the emoluments of which shall have been increased, 
during the term for which he was elected. 
In the proceedings below, Plaintiff contended that he 
had standing to challenge Mr. Jensen's place on the nemocratic 
primary ballot since he is a Republican candidate for the 
State Senate and certain voters who might otherwise vote in 
the Republican primary, and vote for him, would vote in the 
Democratic primary because Mr. Jensen was on that ballot. 
As a remedy, Plaintiff asked that the district court 
issue an order restraining the incumbent Secretary of State, 
Davici S. }~on son, from issuing a certificate for primary 
election in the name of defendant Jensen. 
The district court rejected defendant Jensen's conten-
tion that the Plaintiff had not standing to bring this action 
and that his filing of this suit was untimely in view of ?'r. 
Jensen's long-announced intentions to run for the office of 
-5-
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Secretary of State. However, the trial court granted Defen-
dant's motion to dismiss because Plaintiff's claims are 
clearly governed by the case of Shields v. Toronto 16 Utah 
2d 61, 365 P.2d 829 (1964). The uncontradicted affidavits 
from economic experts and judicial notice of generally known 
economic facts established that the salary increases given 
State executive officers during Mr. Jensen's term as a 
State Senator appeared to be an attempt to maintain their 
salary at a level consistent with current rates of infla-
tion. The district judge also concluded that to deny 
defendant Jensen a position on the September primary bal-
lot would be an interference with the democratic election 
of state officials. Finally, the court concluded that 
S. J. R. No. 7 does not "create a new off"ice within the 
meaning of Article VI Section 7 of the Utah Constitution". 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT CONFORMED WITH 
THIS COURT'S RULING IN SHIELDS v. TORONTO. 
In 1964 this Court held that three candidates for exect~~ 
office were not disqualfied from appearing on primary ballots 
even though they had been members of the 1963 Legislature 
I 
which had enacted a general salary increase raising the 
emoluments of the offices they sought. The Court specifically 
held that their candidacy did not violate the provisions of 
Article VI Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Shields v. T~': 
-6-
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16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P,2d 829 (1964). 
Justice Crockett's comprehensive opinion considers the 
purpose and rationale of Article VI. The opinion states that 
the Article was not designed to prohibit legislators from running 
for office simply because they are members of a body which had 
voted a pay increase for that office. Rather, the purpose of 
the provision is to prevent connivance and manipulation among 
legislators to benefit themselves by creating offices or by 
voting themselves pay increases with the clear purpose of im-
properly enriching themselves. 
When, however, the increases do not enrich the office 
holder, but merely keeps him approximately even with inflation, 
the mischief the provision is meant to prevent would not occur. 
As the opinion states: 
"The important fact here is that the salary 
increases involved could not by any stretch 
of the imagination be regarded as partaking of 
the impropriety just referred to ... (T]hese 
relatively small increases ... should properly 
be regarded as just what they were, a moderate cost 
of living adjustment on an acro~s th7 ~oard 
basis in keeping with the steadily rising cost of 
living. Accordingly, it can be said with assurance 
that this is not a situation which would lend 
itself to any ulterior scheme by a legislator 
to set up a high payine sinecure to take.advantage 
of which Section 7 of Article VI was designed 
to prevent." 395 P. 2d at 831. 
The pay increases at issue in this appeal are precisely 
of the kind approved in Toronto. 
First, there is no suggestion, either in plaintiff's 
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pleadings or in the record before the District Court, that 
there was any improper motivation, manipulation, or attempt to 
benefit Mr. Jensen or any member of the legislature. 
Second, the pay increases were enacted as part of 
legislative bills granting pay increases to other constitutional 
officers of the State. The Governor, the Attorney General, the 
State Auditor and the State Treasurer, all received similar, 
though not exactly equal, percentage increases (all in the 20 
to 30 percent range). 
Third, and most significantly, the record before the 
District Court was abundantly clear that the increases in 
question reflected a legislative attempt to maintain the salary 
level of the Secretary of State during a time of accelerating 
and severe inflation. Indeed, the record demonstrates that the 
real salary of the Secretary of State has been increased by only 
a fraction of a percent during the last ten years. 
In support of his motion to dismiss, respondent submitted 
an affidavit (R. ) prepared by Mr. Frank K. Stuart, an economic 
analyst and consultant. Attached to Mr. Stuart's affidavit, as 
Exhibit 1, was a table showing the effect of inflation on all pay 
increases granted to the Secretary of State since May of 1963 
(R. ). Mr. Stuart's analysis is most revealing. During 
Mr. Jensen's last term in the legislature, the dollar increase 
-8-
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at the Secretary of State's salary was from $22,000 to $33,500. 
During the same period, the adJ·usted real 1·ncome · increased only 
from $17,178 to $17,761 for a total of $583.00. 1 
Mr. Stuart determined that since 1973, the Secretary of 
State has, in real dollar terms, had a decrease in his salary. 
In January of 1972, the salary had a real dollar value of $19,239; 
as of January of 1981, the value will be $17, 761. 
Mr. Stuart's analysis also somewhat understates the 
actual amount of this salary decrease. The Secretary of State 
has no assurance as to when, if ever, his salary will again be 
increased. Thus, in a time of persistent inflation, his fixed 
salary will decrease in real dollar value. 
Mr. Stuart also made a long term analysis of the effect 
of inflation on the Secretary of State's salary. The period 
covered was May, 1963 through January, 1981. This analysis 
showed that between 1963 and 1969, there was an increase in the 
salary's real dollar value. 
1
The analysis was made by using statistical indicators developed 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
These indicators are published in the Department's Survey of 
Current Business. The effect of inflation is determined by 
using what is termed an "implicit price deflator index." 1972 
dollars are shown by the index as having a value of 100. For 
years prior to 1972, when the value of the dollar was greate:, 
the index is less than 100. For succeeding years the value is 
more than 100. Thus, in 1975, the deflator index was 12~.07. 
The estimate for the deflator index for January of 1981 is 
188.62. The difference in deflator index values will, of course, 
determine the actual percentage decrease in the value of the 
salary. 
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With the sharply rising inflation of the late 1960's, the 
real value of the Secretary of State's salary began to erode. 
Since that time, the overall trend has shown a decrease in salan 
value. For the entire eighteen year period between 1963 and 
1981, the salary has shown a slight rate of real dollar increase. 
The Secretary of State experienced an actual dollar increase ~ 
salary from $11,000 to $33,500. This amounted to 204.51'. increase 
which computes to an annual rate of 6. 3%. Over the same eighteer 
year period the real dollar salary increased from $15,413 to 
$17,761, or a percentage increase of 15.2%. The average annual 
increase was only .8%. 
At the hearing on the motion to reconsider, respondent sul· 
mitted an affidavit of Steven J. Nicolatus. Mr. Nicolatus is 
a consulting economist employed by Mr. Stuart. Mr. Nicolatus 
compared the Secretary of State's salary increases with those 
given to professional level State employees. His analysis showec 
that the Secretary of State, between 1970 and 1981, enjoyed an 
annual growth rate in compensation of 6.1/',. A professional em· 
ployee at entry salary level had for the same period a 6. 9% salac 
growth rate. Mr. Nicolatus also considered merit pay increases 
to which professional level employees would be entitled. When thi 
increases are included, the typical professional level employee 
experienced an annual increase of 9%, or some fifty percent more 
than the rate of increase for the Secretary of State. 
-10-
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Mr. Nicolatus also analyzed the increase of the total 
compensation package paid to the Secretary of State. Included 
among these benefit items are F.I.C.A., federal withholding tax, 
insurance and the state retirement plan. Between 1977 and 1981, 
this total benefit package increased from $29,558 to $41,333, 
for a percentage increase of 39.8%. In real dollar terms, however, 
the entire benefit package increased from only $20,860 to 
$21,913. This is a percentage increase of only 5%, which yields 
an average annual growth rate of 1.2%. 
The interesting point about this analysis is that these 
benefit items were not the result of specific legislative enact-
ment. Federal withholding tax, F.I.C.A., insurance, and the 
state retirement plan were granted by either federal law or 
general legislative enactment. Nonetheless, the average rate 
of increase in real dollars during the period was very small in-
deed. 
This economic data demonstrated that the pay increases in 
issue in this litigation in an amount and for a purpose consistent 
with the rule and rationale of Shields v. Toronto. Supra. Enacted 
in a time of persistent and often accelerating inflation, these 
increases reflect a legislative attempt to maintain the pur-
chasing power of the Secretary of State's salary. Indeed, one 
could make a very strong case from the data presented to the Dis-
trict Court that the actual value of the salary has decreased 
during the period of Mr. Jensen's legislative term. 
-11-
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II. SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 7 DID NOT "CREATE" 
A CIVIL OFFICE 
In point 5 of his otherwise generally coIIllllendable 
brief, plaintiff argues that Senate Joint Resolution No. 7 
"is a creation of a new constitutional office." In fact, 
the 1979 legislature did nothing but place before the voters 
of Utah a proposal to modify certain aspects of the Executive 
Article of the Utah Constitution. As mentioned above, one of 
these modifications would change the name of the office of 
Secretary of State, wherever it appears in the Constitution, 
to "Lieutenant Governor" and would change the method of voting 
for this office. These modifications, even if they do amount t 
a "creation of office," are not the creation of the legislatur1 
If they ever become effective, they will be the creation of th1 
electorate of the State of Utah. Of course, no one has "creat1 
anything yet. No one will know whether the so-called "created 
office" will come into existence at all until November, 1980. 
A legislative act placing before the voters the decisic' 
of whether a new administrative or executive office will be 
formed does not constitute "creation" of office as contemplatei 
by Article VI Section 7. State v. Gooding, 22 Idaho 128, 124 
P. 791 (1912), is almost directly on point. There an appoint· 
ment to the office of Commissioner of Highways was challenged 
because the appointee was a member of the legislature that 
authorized the voters and landowners of Idaho to organize a 
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highway district upon certain terms and conditions. The Idaho 
Supreme Court held that this was not the creation of an office. 
The Idaho Supreme Court said: 
"The word 'create' means to cause to exist or 
to bring into existence something which did 
not exist. Said highway district law does not 
create or purport to create any highway district, 
but leaves the creation of such districts with the 
people. Then the question is directly presented: 
Did the Legislature create the office of highway 
commissioner of Shoshone highway district No. 2? 
"At the time the Legislature which enacted 
said highway district law adjourned, there was 
no office of highway commissioner of Shoshone 
highway district No. 2, nor was there such an 
office in the state of Idaho. Said act author-
ized the electors and landowners in the state to 
organize a highway district upon certain terms 
and conditions, if they concluded best to do so. 
"Had the act in question organized certain 
highway districts and provided that such 
district should have certain officers, then 
the Legislature would have created the office. 
But the Legislature by said act did not 
attempt to create any districts whatever. 
They left the creation of the district with the 
people. . . " 124 P. 792-93. 
The Gooding opinion is almost exactly analogous 
with the Utah Legislature's actions in S.J.R. No. 7. The 
Legislature has done no more than propose to the people of 
Utah that certain items of the Executive Article of the Utah 
Constitution be revised. These revisions will not take effect 
until the general election of November, 1980. If any office 
has been created, it will not have been created until then 
and it will not have been created by the Legislature, but by 
the vote of the people. 
-13-
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In fact, S. J. R. No. 7 does not create a ~ office at 
It merely changes the name of an old office and modifies the 
method by which votes are cast for that office. In Westernpor 
v. Green, 144 Md. 85, 124 A. 403 (1923), the Maryland General 
Assembly enacted a statute which, in effect, changed the metho: 
of electing a town clerk and made the clerk responsible for 
collecting municipal taxes (a duty that had previously been 
performed by a bailiff). The Maryland court held that in chani 
ing the duties of the clerk and in changing the method by whic: 
he was elected, the Maryland Legislature had not created a 
new office but merely modified the form and duties of an old 
one. 
Nothing has been changed in the office of Secretary 
of State except its name and the method by which votes are 
cast for the office. No new office has been created. 
III. THE RESULT URGED HERE IS CONSISTENT WITH JUDICIAl 
AUTHORITY FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS. 
Courts of other jurisdictions have construed constit-
utional provisions similar to Article VI Section 7, to permit 
the candidacy for public office of otherwise qualified candid· 
ates. Though challenges to candidacy have arisen in a 
variety of factual settings and under differing constitutional 
provisions, the courts repeatedly have found in the spirit and 
purpose of such provisions strong reasons for permitting candid· 
ates to be either approved or rejected by the electoral process. 
-14-
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Prominent among these decisions is the Florida case 
of State ex rel. West v. Gray, 74 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1954), where 
a special election was necessary because of the death of the 
governor during his term of office. A member of the state 
legislature who had voted to increase the governor's salary 
declared his candidacy for the office. In construing the Florida 
constitutional provision in issue, the Court reviewed the history 
and purpose of that provision. 
The Court first noted that: 
The Constitution is concerned with substance 
and not with form and its framers did not in-
tend to forbid a common sense of application 
of its provisions. 
Gray, supra, 7450 2d at 118. It also explained that: 
All of the authorities are in agreement 
that such a provision as is involved in 
this proceeding is inserted in a constit-
ution for the purpose of taking from a 
senator or representative "any personal 
motive which might operate upon him to 
create a new office or increase the 
emoluments of any office, new or old." 
Tucker on the Constitution, Vol. 1, p. 
442. As the matter is stated by Mr. 
Justice Story, "The reasons for exclud-
ing persons from offices who have been 
concerned in creating them, or increas-
ing their emoluments, ar7 to take ~way! 
as far as possible, any improper bias in 
the vote of the representative, and to secure 
to the constituents some soleIIm pledge 
of his disinterestedness." Story on the 
Constitution, 5th Ed., Vol. I, section 867, 
p. 633. (Emphasis in original). 
The Court then considered changes in "public conditions" 
since the enactment of the constitutional provision in question. 
-15-
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Public conditions are vastly different 
today. Many of the offices which were 
appointive under the original Constitution 
of 1885 have now, by amendment thereto, 
been made elective. With the free dis-
semination of news and the close coverage 
given the legislative deliberations by 
press and radio, the people are much 
better informed concerning the actions of 
their legislators than they were in 1885, 
and they can express their approval or 
disapproval of such actions at the polls. 
We have no doubt that, as to elective 
offices, Section 5 of Article III was 
calculated to, and did, serve a useful 
purpose in the early days of this state's 
history; indeed, it still does, within 
the reasonable limits and for the plain 
purposes for which it was enacted. But 
what was then thought to be a shield can, 
if so strictly interpreted as to enlarge it 
beyond its purpose, become a sword -- a 
weapon which might easily eliminate capable 
men from offering for public office . . . 
Gray, supra, 7450 2d at 117. 
Since the pay increase for which the prospective 
candidate had voted as a legislator applied only to the term 
of the governor then in office, and since the governor's 
untimely death could not have been anticipated, the 
Court reasoned that there was no real possibility that the 
candidate had been influenced by improper motives when he 
voted on the matter as a legislator. Since the evil which 
the provision was designed to prevent did not occur, the pro-
vision did not prohibit the legislator's candidacy. 
The Court also emphasized that the legislator would 
be required to run against formidable opponents in both the 
primary and general elections when his candidacy would be 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
submitted to the electorate. For those reasons, the Florida 
Court concluded that the emoluments of the office of governor 
were not increased by the legislature so as to render a 
legislator inelligible for the office. 
In State v. Dubuque, 413 P.2d 972 (Wash 1966), the 
Supreme Court of Washington resolved a challenge to the eligi-
bility of members of the state legislature to run for re-
election after their membershad voted to increase their own 
salaries. Washington's constitutional provision is virtually 
identical to that which is in issue here, and it was contended 
that since members of the legislature had voted to increase 
the emoluments of the office of legislator, they could not, 
during their term of office, run for re-election to that 
office. 
In construing the section, the court noted that: 
A strong public policy exists in favor 
of eligibility for public office, and 
the constitution, where the language 
and context allows, should be construed 
so as to preserve this eligibility. 
Dubuque, supra, 413 P.2d at 981. The court proceeded to explain 
that the constitutional provision was designed, in part, to: 
. . prevent a member of the legisl~ture 
from increasing the salaries of public 
officials and then, during the term for . 
which he was elected legislator, maneuvering 
to obtain the increased salary without an 
intervening election. 
-17-
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The court observed that one of the purposes of the constitu-
tional provision will be satisfied if the voters have an 
opportunity to pass on the leeislator's actions in increasing 
public salaries. The court held therefore that: 
. . . where the salary increase does not 
take effect during the term for which 
the legislator was elected to the 
legislature, he is not ineligible to 
stand for election to and serve in an 
office at a higher salary conunencing 
with the expiration of his elected term 
as legislator, because no part of the 
increase will be earned during the 
legislator's incumbent term of office. 
Dubuaue, supra, 
concluded: 
Explaining the basis of its holding the court 
We favor an interpretation tending to 
unfetter the process of election as 
more in keeping with democratic ideals 
than a construction which inclines to 
curtain the freedom to stand for office. 
Despite the criticism and complaints 
frequently directed by the people toward 
their legislature, that body remains the 
single most democratic organ of constitu-
tional government yet devised, reflecting 
with greater clarity and frequency probably 
than any of our institutions--save possibly 
the public schools--the will and aspirations 
of a free people. From this academy of 
free representative government have come 
some of our greatest presidents, ablest 
jurists, most capable members of the 
congress, and outstanding statesmen. 
Perhaps no greater school exists for the 
training of men to leadership in a 
democracy than service in a state legisla-
ture. The constitution ought, therefore, 
where its language is susceptible of many 
meanings, be construed to augment and 
foster rather than curb and curtail the 
elective process. Eligibility should be 
presumed rather than be denied. 
-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The foregoing review of decisions from other juris-
dictions reveals that the analysis and application of our 
constitution by this Court in Shields v. Toronto, supra, is 
in harmony with the decisions and rulings of other courts and, 
on the strength of the construction given the provisions in 
issue by other courts, as well as this Court, the trial 
court's ruling should be affirmed. 
IV. PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING TO BRING THE PRESENT 
ACTION. 
In addition to the other grounds stated in this 
brief, respondent submits that dismissal of plaintiff's 
complaint is proper because plaintiff did not demonstrate 
a sufficient interest in the outcome of this litigation to 
claim standing as a proper party plaintiff. 
The District Court ruled on the following theory 
that plaintiff does in fact have standing: Plaintiff is 
a candidate for the Republican nomination for Utah State 
Senate from Senate District No. 8 and his name will appear 
on the September 9 primary ballot. Because it is possible 
that some voters, who might otherwise vote for him in the 
Republican primary, may choose to vote in the Democratic 
primary because they wish to cast ballots for Moroni L. Jensen, 
plaintiff's own candidacy may be damaged. 
Plaintiff offered no evidence in support of his 
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